Campaign Dynamics and Strategic Voting in UK Parliamentary Elections
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.. bibsource:: ../papers.bib
.. pub-details:: elff.kosmidis.murr:dynamics.strategic.voting
        
.. abstract::

   The 2010 British General Election is a rare case: voters faced
   a potential coalition government.  As a result, did voters engage in policy
   balancing, the type of tactical voting found in systems with frequent
   coalition governments?  Or did they react in the opposite way: casting a
   tactical vote to avoid a hung parliament and coalition government?  We test
   these new types of tactical voting in British elections using survey data
   from the 2010 election.  We use a novel finite-mixture model to simultaneously
   estimate all types of voting while accounting for measurement uncertainty.
   We find evidence that some voters tried to avoid a hung parliament, but we
   find no evidence that voters engaged in policy balancing. Among other things,
   these results imply that citizens voted for the Liberal Democrats not because
   they wanted to "limit the damage" of a Tory government.  Instead, they
   voted for them because it was their sincere preference or because their
   preferred party had no chance of winning in the constituency.

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